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IN 1985, individuals  filing U.S.  tax returns  reported $166.4 billion of 
long-term capital gains in excess  of short-term  capital losses.'  The 
following year Congress enacted a significant  increase in capital gains 
taxes effective in 1987, and capital gains realizations  for 1986 nearly 
doubled,  to $324.8  billion.2  That  investors' expectations  of tax changes 
would alter their realization  practices markedly  comes as no surprise. 
How changing  rates would affect tax revenues and realizations  in the 
longer  run  is not as obvious. 
Largely  as a result  of the capital  gains tax increase of 1986,  the U.S. 
presidential  campaign  of 1988 saw an intensification  of a continuing 
debate  over capital  gains  taxes. Proponents  of reducing  capital  gains  tax 
rates argue that lower rates would reduce economic distortions and 
encourage  investment  in new enterprises  while raising tax revenue by 
increasing realization of gains more than enough to offset the rate 
reduction.  Opponents  of cutting  capital  gains tax rates believe it would 
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1.  Congressional Budget Office, How Capital Gains Tax Rates Affect Revenues:  The 
Historical Evidence (CBO, March 1988), table 4. 
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reduce rather than raise revenue and see one of its main effects as 
increasing  the after-tax  income of the wealthy.3 
How responsive  realizations  of capital  gains are to tax rates has been 
the subject of continuing policy debate. A  study published by the 
Treasury's  Office of Economic Policy in June simulated  the effects of 
reductions  in long-term  capital  gains  tax rates  enacted in 1978  and 1981, 
and concluded  that tax revenue increased  during  1979-85  as a result of 
these tax cuts-a  finding  that was immediately  challenged.4  A similarly 
contentious  debate  arose 10  years  ago, when  President  Carter's  proposal 
to raise capital  gains taxes led to the capital  gains tax reductions  of the 
1978  Revenue Act.5 
This paper  begins  with a review of the recent  dispute  and  then moves 
to a more  general  discussion both of whether  reducing  capital  gains tax 
rates  will raise  or lower revenue  and  of whether  cutting  the capital  gains 
tax is sensible  government  policy. Such  a discussion  must  go well beyond 
the limited  issues of measuring  the revenues from the capital  gains tax 
alone. Most important,  taxing  income  from  other  sources  at a higher  rate 
than  long-term  capital  gains  provides  incentives  for  individuals  to choose 
investment  assets on the basis of minimizing  taxes and  to divert  income 
to capital  gains  form. A full treatment  of the revenue  consequences of a 
capital  gains tax cut would  thus require  looking  at the income tax lost in 
addition  to the capital  gains tax lost or gained. Taking  account of such 
changes  in individuals'  behavior  would  also be important  in considering 
broader  questions  of the economic efficiency  of the tax system. 
Several  conclusions  follow  from  a careful  consideration  of the  relevant 
3.  See Jane  G. Gravelle,  "Will  Reducing  Capital  Gains  Taxes Raise Revenue?" Tax 
Notes,  vol. 36  (July  27, 1987),  pp. 419-24;  and  Jane  G. Gravelle  and  Lawrence  B. Lindsey, 
"Capital  Gains," Tax Notes,  vol. 38 (January  25, 1988),  pp. 397-405. 
4.  Michael  Darby,  Robert  Gillingham,  and  John  S. Greenlees,  "The Direct  Revenue 
Effects of Capital  Gains Taxation:  A Reconsideration  of the Time-Series  Evidence," 
Treasury Bulletin  (June 1988);  Joseph J. Minarik,  "The New Treasury  Capital  Gains 
Study: What Is in the Black Box?" Tax Notes,  vol. 39 (June 20, 1988), pp. 1465-71; 
Michael  Darby,  Robert  Gillingham,  and John S. Greenlees, "The Black Box Revealed: 
Reply  to Minarik,"  Tax Notes,  vol. 40 (July  25, 1988),  pp. 413-16. 
5. John Yinger, "Feldstein on Capital  Gains Realizations,"  Council of Economic 
Advisors  Staff  Paper  (September  1978);  Martin  Feldstein, "The Appropriate  Taxation  of 
Capital  Gains:  A Response to John Yinger," Tax Notes,  vol. 7 (October  30, 1978),  pp. 
507-08; William  D. Nordhaus, "Claimed  Effects of Gains Tax Cuts: A Mirage?"  Tax 
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econometric, theoretical, and policy issues. First, tax considerations 
heavily  influence  investors'  decisions  about  when  to realize  capital  gains. 
Most noticeably, if capital gains taxes are expected to fall (rise) next 
year, capital  gains  realizations  will be postponed  (accelerated)  this year. 
Second, empirical work to date has failed to distinguish adequately 
between such temporary  effects of tax changes on realizations  and the 
permanent effects of different tax rates. There is  little convincing 
evidence of a strong  permanent  effect. Third,  most recent research  has 
focused on the effect of lower capital  gains tax rates on revenues from 
the  capital  gains  tax. It  is theoretically  possible  that  increased  realizations 
would  more  than  offset the effect of lower rates  on tax revenues. But the 
existing  time  series  evidence  is that  it isjust as possible  that  the responses 
of investors to a tax cut will reinforce,  rather  than offset, the effect of 
lower rates in reducing revenues. Fourth, whatever their accuracy, 
estimated changes in individual  capital gains tax payments associated 
with capital  gains tax rate changes  are a poor indicator  of the efficiency 
or incidence  of such policies. Finally, other  changes  in the treatment  of 
capital gains are better suited to  achieve the efficiency objectives 
embraced  by some proponents  as the main  reason  for reducing  tax rates 
on realized  long-term  capital  gains. 
The Recent Debate 
By and  large,  investors  can choose when to realize  their  capital  gains. 
Since capital  gains are taxed only when they are realized, realizations 
will naturally  be sensitive to taxation. Table 1 gives the value of long- 
term  capital  gains realized  each year during  1954-87, the ratio of those 
capital  gains to the Standard  and Poor's 500 stock price index (as a way 
to scale the value of the gains), and the average  marginal  tax rates that 
applied to  those gains. Aside from the unprecedented increase in 
realizations  in 1986  that preceded the largest increase in capital gains 
taxes during  the period, the most significant  increase in realizations 
occurred  in 1979,  after  the tax reduction  passed  in 1978.  The 1979  episode 
lent support  to the view that tax cuts do increase realizations  substan- 
tially. But the huge increase in realizations  in 1986 suggests that the 
expected change in rates, rather than the level of rates, may be the 
important  factor governing realizations. Nevertheless, analysts have Table 1.  Capital Gains and Marginal Tax Rates,  1954-87 
Capital  Ratio  of 
gainsa  gains  to  Marginal 
(billions  S&P 500  tax rateb 
Year  of dollars)  index  (percent) 
1954  7.0  0.24  17.3 
1955  9.7  0.24  17.7 
1956  9.6  0.21  18.0 
1957  8.2  0.18  17.2 
1958  9.3  0.20  17.3 
1959  12.9  0.22  17.1 
1960  11.7  0.21  16.7 
1961  15.7  0.24  17.1 
1962  13.6  0.22  16.8 
1963  14.5  0.21  16.9 
1964  17.0  0.21  16.2 
1965  20.8  0.24  16.1 
1966  21.8  0.26  16.2 
1967  27.3  0.30  16.7 
1968  35.8  0.36  18.6 
1969  32.6  0.33  18.8 
1970  21.3  0.26  19.5 
1971  28.2  0.29  19.9 
1972  36.1  0.33  20.1 
1973  35.8  0.33  19.5 
1974  30.0  0.36  19.5 
1975  30.7  0.36  20.1 
1976  39.2  0.38  21.9 
1977  44.4  0.45  22.2 
1978  48.9  0.51  22.7 
1979  71.3  0.69  18.1 
1980  70.8  0.59  18.6 
1981  78.3  0.61  16.8 
1982  87.1  0.73  14.8 
1983  117.3  0.73  14.4 
1984  135.9  0.85  14.0 
1985  166.4  0.89  13.9 
1986  324.8  1.37  14.4c 
1987  n.a.  n.a.  25.4c 
Sources:  Congressional  Budget  Office,  Howv  Capital  Gainis Tax Rates  Affect  Revetniues: The Historical  Evidence 
(CBO,  March 1988), tables 3 and 8. Capital gains for 1985 are corrected,  and those for 1986 are calculated,  using the 
CBO  method,  from  U.S.  Internal Revenue  Service,  Statistics  of Inicomle  for  1986: Individual Income  Tax Retluns 
(IRS,  November  28,  1987), advance  data table  1. 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  Long-term  gains  net of  short-term losses  from Schedule  D,  plus  long-term gains  appearing directly  on  Form 
1040. 
b.  Weighted average  marginal tax rate on long-term capital gains. 
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tried to draw conclusions about the effect of rate levels, mainly  from 
models that  ignored  the effect of expected changes  in rates. 
Much of the empirical  research on capital gains taxation has been 
based on cross-section  microeconomic  data. In many ways, the house- 
hold is preferable  to the economy as a whole as the unit to study, since 
households  differ  substantially  in  both  tax status  and  behavior.  However, 
if panel  data  that  track  individual  households  over time are unavailable, 
time series data make it possible to assess the impact of actual tax 
changes.  Recent  research  and  debate  have been based  on aggregate  time 
series, with some studies predicting  that a capital gains tax cut would 
raise  revenue  and  others  that  it would  lower it.6  It is useful  to begin  with 
the following equation, estimated using annual data over the sample 
1954-85  (with  t-statistics  in parentheses): 
(1)  ln (LTG)  =  -8.84  +  1.17 ln (PRICE)  +  0.50 ln (RCE) 
(-7.04)  (5.52)  (4.17) 
+ 1.02 ln (RGNP)  +  2.01 dln (RGNP) 
(3.01)  (2.51) 
-0.56  In (MTR), 
(-2.48) 
Durbin-Watson  = 1.37;  R2 = 0.985. 
Equation  1 is a log-log  specification,  with  dependent  and  independent 
variables  entering  in logarithmic  form. LTG  is realized  long-term  gains 
net of short-term  losses, PRICE is the GNP deflator,  RCE is the real 
value of corporate  equity held at the end of the year by households (as 
computed  by the Federal  Reserve's Flow of Funds Division), RGNP is 
6. Aside from  Darby,  Gillingham,  and  Greenlees,  "Direct  Revenue  Effects  of Capital 
Gains  Taxation,"  Lawrence  B. Lindsey, "Capital  Gains:  Rates, Realizations  and Reve- 
nues,"  in  Martin Feldstein,  ed.,  The Effects  of  Taxation  on  Capital  Accumulation 
(University  of Chicago  Press, 1987),  also suggests  that  a reduction  in capital  gains  tax rates 
would raise revenue. Lindsey creates a panel from aggregate  statistics by considering 
separate  income classes at each date as separate  observations.  The major  piece finding 
that  capital  gains tax cuts reduce  revenue  is CBO, How Capital  Gains Tax  Rates Affect 
Revenues.  Also  see CBO, Effects of the 1981 Tax Act on the Distribution of Income and 
Taxes  Paid (CBO, August 1986);  U.S. Treasury,  Office  of Tax Analysis, Report to the 
Congress on the Capital Gains Tax Reductions  of 1978 (Treasury, September  1985); and 
Gerald  Auten, "Capital  Gains:  An Evaluation  of the 1978  and 1981  Tax Cuts," in Charls 
E. Walker and Mark A.  Bloomfield,  eds.,  New  Directions  in Federal  Tax Policy for  the 
1980s  (Ballinger,  1983),  pp. 121-48. 600  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
real  GNP, and  MTR is the weighted  average  household  marginal  tax rate 
on long-term  capital  gains. 
There  are many  ways to construct  the capital  gains and marginal  tax 
rate variables  used in equation 1. The definitions  used here are taken 
from the March 1988 Congressional Budget Office study, and the 
equation  itself replicates  one of that study's equations.7  The June 1988 
Treasury  study estimates the same equation with somewhat different 
definitions for the dependent and tax rate variables, arriving at a 
coefficient  for the logarithm  of the latter  of - 0.67, rather  than - 0.56.8 
Even though  these differences  in results  do not change  one's qualitative 
conclusion  about  the behavior  of capital  gains  realizations,  it is useful to 
review the issue of variable  construction  because it highlights  some of 
the difficulties  of using  aggregate  time series. 
Throughout  the 1954-85 sample period (ending only with the Tax 
Reform  Act of 1986),  tax law made  a distinction  between long-term  and 
short-term  capital gains, with long-term  gains (those associated with 
assets held for more than six months, nine months for a one-year 
transition  period, or one year, depending  on the date) being subject to 
favorable tax treatment. Researchers commonly focus on long-term 
gains, largely because most realized gains are long-term ones.9 But 
capital  losses must  also be dealt  with. The tax law treats  gains  and  losses 
asymmetrically,  with  gains  being  fully  taxable  but  losses, after  offsetting 
gains, being subject to a limitation  on their deductibility  against other 
income.  10  Aggregate  studies typically  exclude taxpayers  with net long- 
7.  Equation  A-14, p. 88. There are slight  differences  in the second decimal  place of 
some coefficients,  apparently  due to data  revisions.  The constants  also differ;  because  of 
the log-log  specification,  the choice of units  affects  the constant. 
8. Darby,  Gillingham,  and  Greenlees,  "Direct  Revenue  Effects," table  3, equation  4. 
9.  In 1985,  for example, individual  taxpayers  with net long-term  capital  gains (after 
deduction  of long-term  losses and  loss carryovers)  reported  total  long-term  gains  of $168.7 
billion. Short-term  gains measured  in the same manner  were only $6.1 billion. See U.S. 
Internal Revenue  Service,  Statistics  of Income for 1985: Individual Income  Tax Returns, 
table 1.4, p. 22. 
10. A taxpayer  first  matches  gross long-term  losses against  gross long-term  gains  and 
gross short-term  losses against  gross short-term  gains  to arrive  at a net long-term  position 
(gain  or loss) and a net short-term  position. If either  position  shows a loss, the taxpayer 
then  offsets  net  short-term  losses against  net  long-term  gains  or  net  long-term  losses against 
net short-term  gains. Net long-term  gains (until 1986,  after a partial  exclusion) and net 
short-term  gains  are  then  fully  taxable.  Only  taxpayers  with  net overall  losses then  face an 
overall  $3,000  limit  on use of losses to offset other  taxable  income, with the limit  applied Alan  J. Auerbach  601 
term  losses from  their analysis, on the grounds  that such taxpayers  are 
likely  to face loss limitations  and  be little  affected  by changes  in statutory 
marginal  tax rates. The June 1988  Treasury  study attempts  to explain 
net long-term gains plus net short-term gains, while the March 1988 CBO 
study excludes short-term  gains and goes one step further  by adding 
capital gain distributions  not reported separately. Though one could 
debate their merits, none of these adjustments  is especially important 
quantitatively. 
Finally, it is necessary in aggregate regressions to choose "the" 
marginal  tax rate. CBO  uses a weighted-average  marginal  tax rate, with 
weights  based  on predicted  capital  gains  realizations  to avoid simultane- 
ity bias. Treasury  uses a high-income  average  marginal  tax rate, based 
on a sample of taxpayers with more than $200,000 (1982 dollars) of 
adjusted  gross income. A similar  alternative  tax rate measure  was also 
considered by CBO.  1I1 
Consider  the implications  of equation 1 for investor  behavior.  Given 
the log-log  specification,  one may  interpret  the coefficient  of the tax rate 
term  as the elasticity of realizations  with respect to the tax rate. When 
average  and marginal  tax rates are equal, the direct revenue from this 
uniform  tax will increase  with a tax cut if and  only if this elasticity  is less 
than -  1, that  is, has an absolute  value  greater  than 1. Though  their  exact 
estimates differ, both Treasury  and CBO find elasticities considerably 
below 1 in absolute value. Yet, in its simulations  of the effects of the 
1978  and 1981  tax cuts based on its version of this equation, Treasury 
finds  that  each tax cut raised tax revenue  in each but the first  year after 
enactment.  12 There is, of course, nothing  particularly  special about the 
revenue  break-even  point;  cutting  a distortionary  tax could  lose revenue 
and  still  make  good economic sense. However, the current  concern  over 
budget deficits, together with a continuing  quest for the elusive free 
lunch,  seems to have affected  the grounds  of public  debate  on this issue. 
to the sum  of net long-term  losses (again,  until 1986  after  a partial  exclusion)  and short- 
term  losses. For  further  discussion,  see James  M. Poterba,  "How  Burdensome  Are  Capital 
Gains  Taxes? Evidence  from the United States," Journal  of Plublic Economics, vol. 33 
(July  1987),  pp. 157-72. 
11. Even in cross-section  studies based on individual  household  data, the choice of 
appropriate  tax rate  is not simple,  since each individual  faces a tax schedule  rather  than  a 
single  tax rate.  This  issue is discussed  more  fully  below, 
12. Darby,  Gillingham,  and  Greenlees,  "Direct  Revenue  Effects," table  5, col. 4. 602  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
The key to Treasury's  estimate  that  revenues  will increase  with a cut 
in capital  gains  taxes, despite a realization  elasticity  well below unity, is 
its implicit  assumption  that the capital  gains tax cuts of 1978  and 1981 
not only lowered  marginal  tax rates  but also increased  average  tax rates 
relative  to marginal  tax rates. Revenue equals the level of realizations, 
which depends on the marginal  tax rate, multiplied  by the average  tax 
rate. Given the marginal  tax rate, therefore,  an increase in the average 
tax rate raises revenue, regardless  of the investor response to marginal 
tax rates:  it is a lump-sum  tax. A policy that  cuts marginal  tax rates  more 
than average tax rates may be seen as a standard  tax cut to which the 
unitary-elasticity  rule applies, combined with a lump-sum  tax. If the 
lump-sum  tax is large  enough,  it can  lead  to an  overall  increase  in revenue 
even for a very small  increase  in realizations. 
Although  the gap  between  marginal  and  average  tax rates  has actually 
narrowed  during  the past several years, it has not done so because  of 
changes in capital  gains taxes. Yet Treasury's  methodology  attributes 
the entire change in average  tax rates following the 1978  and 1981  acts 
to the capital  gains  provisions  of these acts.  13 
There are clearly other reasons why the gap between average and 
marginal  tax rates has narrowed. Calculations  by the Congressional 
Budget Office find that bracket  creep alone (which does not affect the 
aggregate  marginal  tax rate used in the Treasury  study) raised capital 
gains tax revenues between 1981  and 1984  by $0.8 billion, or 4 percent 
of 1984 tax revenue from this source.14 An additional  $1.3 billion is 
attributable  to the minimum  tax provisions introduced  in 1982, which 
are also (given  Treasury's  specification)  largely  inframarginal  increases 
in average  tax rates  between 1980  and 1984  that  have little  to do with the 
capital  gains provisions of the 1981  act. Omitting  these two sources of 
1984  revenue  from  the comparison,  CBO  estimates  that  the 1981  capital 
gains tax cut reduced 1984  long-term  capital  gains tax revenues by $1.7 
billion.  CBO  estimates  that  revenue  would  have fallen  much  more-$5.6 
billion-absent  any increase in capital  gains realizations,  the so-called 
''static" revenue  loss. 
13.  Treasury, Capital Gains Tax Reductions  of 1978. For example, Treasury uses the 
actual 1980  average  tax rate  as an estimate  of what  the 1984  average  tax rate  would  have 
been without  the 1981  capital  gains  tax cut. 
14. CBO, "Simulating  the Revenue Effects of Changes  in the Taxation  of Capital 
Gains," Staff Working  Paper  (November 1988).  I am grateful  to Eric Toder and Larry 
Ozanne  of CBO  for providing  me with the preliminary  figures. Alan J. Auerbach  603 
One could reasonably  conclude from the recent debate  that a capital 
gains tax cut would not raise revenue but would offset a substantial 
fraction of the impact of lower rates through increased realizations. 
However,  it is important  to question  whether  equations  such  as equation 
1 are properly  specified  and whether  increases  in current  realizations  of 
long-term  gains have revenue implications  beyond those directly mea- 
sured. 
A Closer Look at the Time Series Evidence 
Econometric  specification  of aggregate  equations  explaining  capital 
gains realizations involves two  important issues.  One is  inference 
problems  associated with the time series properties  of aggregate  series. 
The other,  more  central,  point  is the question  of how to model  the effects 
of tax rates on realizations to permit a realistic characterization  of 
taxpayer  behavior. 
Several  analysts  have tried  to estimate  the effects of taxation  on long- 
term  capital  gains  realizations  using  annual  postwar  time  series. Virtually 
none of their equations includes even a time trend, and none of the 
authors  seems to worry  about  the use of highly  nonstationary  time series 
for prediction  and  hypothesis  testing. 
Of the potentially serious problems associated with nonstationary 
time series regressions,  perhaps  the most important  is that  test statistics 
such as t-ratios  are not estimated  correctly  and significance  levels may 
be greatly overstated.'5  A second problem  is that such regressions  are 
dominated  by long-run  relationships  among the dependent and inde- 
pendent  variables.  To the extent that  tax rates and  realizations  are each 
affected by omitted variables (such as the population's size and age 
structure  and per capita income) that drive the underlying  nonstation- 
arity,  the direct  effect of tax rates on realizations  will be estimated  with 
bias. 
To explore the importance  of these problems  in the current  case, I 
begin  with  another  equation  based  on the March  1988  CBO  study, similar 
to equation  1 but with a time trend  added  and with the marginal  tax rate 
15. This was first  emphasized  using  Monte  Carlo  results  by C. W. J. Granger  and P. 
Newbold, "Spurious  Regressions in Econometrics,"  Journal of Econometrics,  vol. 2 
(1974),  pp. 111-20. Also see P. C. B. Phillips, "Understanding  Spurious  Regressions  in 
Econometrics,"  Journal  of Econometrics,  vol. 33 (December  1986),  pp. 311-40. 604  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
rather  than  its logarithm  used as an  explanatory  variable.  16  This equation 
is reported  in table 2 as equation 2. In this semilog form, the implied 
elasticity of the dependent variable  with respect to the tax rate is the 
coefficient of the tax rate multiplied  by the tax rate; the higher the 
coefficient  in absolute value, the lower the "revenue-maximizing"  tax 
rate at which the elasticity equals  -  1. For example, the revenue- 
maximizing  tax rate  implied  by equation  2 is 34.6 percent.  17 
Equation  2, like equation 1, is characterized  by a very high  R2 and a 
low Durbin-Watson  statistic, as one would expect from a regression 
based  on nonstationary  time  series.  The  Durbin-Watson  statistic  is raised 
somewhat by the inclusion of the time trend, which proves to be a 
significant  explanatory  variable.  However, using a time trend  does not 
solve the potential  problems  of using  nonstationary  regressors  that  may 
remain  nonstationary  even after  being  detrended.  Therefore,  it is useful 
to compare  these results with those obtained  when equation  2 is differ- 
enced. 
The differenced  version  of equation  2 is reported  as equation  3 in table 
2. Perhaps most important, the coefficient of the marginal  tax rate 
increases with differencing,  implying  a revenue-maximizing  tax rate of 
23.4 percent. As expected, there  is a considerable  decline in the fraction 
of the dependent  variable's  variance  explained  by the regression.  Along 
with this change comes a reduction in the t-statistics of some of the 
nonstationary  variables, notably  the GNP deflator,  real GNP, the pro- 
portional  change in real GNP, and the time trend itself (which appears 
as a constant in the differenced  specification).  In addition,  the Durbin- 
Watson statistic increases and indicates little serial correlation  in sub- 
sequent  specifications. 
CHANGES  IN  TAX  RATES 
Previous studies have typically added the lagged tax rate as an 
explanatory  variable  to these basic equations  to determine  the extent to 
16. This semilog  specification  is chosen because it is more common  in the literature, 
thus making  comparisons  easier. Qualitatively  similar  results  hold  for the log-log  specifi- 
cation. 
17. In  light  of the preceding  discussion  of the  importance  of average  as well  as marginal 
tax rates  in determining  whether  tax cuts raise  revenue,  it is clearly  misleading  to refer  to 
the  marginal  tax  rate  associated  with  a unitary  elasticity  as revenue-maximizing.  However, 
this is the terminology  that  has been  adopted  in the literature. Alan J. Auerbach  605 
which the tax rate  responsiveness  of capital  gains realizations  is tempo- 
rary rather than permanent.  Equation 4 in table 2 is typical of such 
equations,  including  the change  in tax rates  over the past year as well as 
the current  tax rate.  This  equation  also substitutes  the value  of the year's 
average value of the New York Stock Exchange index, found to be 
significant  by Joseph Minarik,  for the insignificant  proportional  change 
in  real  GNP.  18  This  minor  change  in  specification  improves  the equation's 
overall  fit,  as determined  by the  R2  and  Durbin-Watson  statistic,  although 
it has no qualitatively  important  effects on the results concerning  the 
effects of taxation.  19 
Before considering  further  the coefficient  of the lagged  tax rate, it is 
useful to review the predictions  of theory. One would predict that an 
expected increase in next year's tax rate would increase current  reali- 
zations, as investors speed up realizations.  Indeed, one would expect 
the degree of uncertainty  about such tax rates to matter,  as well, since 
holding  a capital  gain is like buying  an option based on future  tax rates. 
Empirically,  this additional  refinement  cannot  be tested  given  the limited 
years of data  available.  The theoretical  role of the lagged  tax rate  is a bit 
more difficult  to ascertain.  In a structural  model of capital  gains realiza- 
tions, one might  well argue  that  it is irrelevant.  The lagged  tax rate  plays 
no clear role in an individual's  current  optimization  problem  trading  off 
the gains of portfolio adjustments  against the tax costs of realization. 
Nonetheless, there  are  two conceivable  reasons  for including  the lagged 
tax rate  if one interprets  equations  such as equation  4 as reduced  forms. 
First, one may justify inclusion of a lagged tax rate as a proxy for 
future  tax rate changes, in much  the way that traditional  empirical  tests 
of the permanent  income hypothesis included  lagged  as well as current 
18. -Minarik,  "The  New Treasury  Capital  Gains  Study." 
19. Indeed,  regressions  reported  in an earlier  draft  of this paper  for the specification 
based on lagged  GNP are even stronger  in their support  of the effects of anticipated  tax 
changes  than  the results  presented  below. Using  as an alternative  to the NYSE index  the 
midyear  values  of the Federal  Reserve's  wealth  variable  produced  results  almost  identical 
to those reported,  suggesting  that long-term  capital  gains realizations  respond  to wealth 
changes  with  a short  lag. This  result  makes  sense, given  that  for  most  of the sample  period 
the minimum  holding  period  for long-term  capital  gains  was six months. 
Another  variable  considered  in equations  not reported  was the value  of noncorporate 
equity,  which  includes  household  real  estate holdings.  This  variable  was insignificant,  and 
its inclusion  had little effect on other coefficients. Likewise having  little effect was the 
addition  of more  than  one lagged  value of the tax rate  and using  only capital  gains  rather 
than  total  changes  in value (which  also include  new purchases)  of corporate  and noncor- 
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income as explanatory  variables. One might  expect the lagged  tax rate 
to have a positive coefficient,  as high  past  tax rates  relative  to the present 
indicate  that  tax rates may rise in the future.  Here, as in other  contexts, 
one faces the "Lucas critique" that in this reduced-form  equation  the 
coefficient  of the lagged  tax rate  depends  on two structural  relationships, 
the responsiveness of realizations  to expected future  tax rates and the 
process relating  future  tax rates to current  and lagged  tax rates. Hence, 
the coefficient is difficult  to use in predicting  the effects of a policy 
change  that changes  not only the level of tax rates but also the environ- 
ment  in which tax rates  are set. 
A second reason for including  the lagged tax rate is as a proxy for 
investors' past realization  practices. Even a permanent  change in tax 
rates  would have different  short-run  and  long-run  effects because of the 
initial  level of unrealized  gains  when  the tax change  occurs. For  example, 
if taxes are lowered, investors might initially  have very high levels of 
unrealized  gains, having realized few gains during  the preceding  high- 
tax years. During the first years after the tax cut, a transition to a 
generally higher rate of realizations out of total gains would cause 
realizations  to rise more initially  than in the long run.20  Thus, if taxes 
were high in the past, previous realizations might have been lower, 
leading  to higher  realizations  today. Here, again, the lagged tax rate is 
serving  as a proxy for another  variable,  in this case past realizations  or 
the level of locked-in  gains. 
In both cases, one might  expect the change  in tax rates  over the past 
year to have a negative  sign. Though  it does have this sign in equations 
4 and  5, it never  enters  with  any  significance.  It is particularly  insignificant 
in equation 5 when the one-period-ahead  tax rate change and lagged 
capital  gains also appear  in the specification,  supporting  the argument 
that it does not belong in the equation.21 
20. This point is made in more detail by Donald W. Kiefer, "The Capital  Gains 
Response  to a Tax Rate Change:  Is It Overestimated?"  Congressional  Research  Service 
Report  (March  18, 1988),  who demonstrates  its importance  using regressions  based on 
simulated  data. 
21. A comparison  of equation  4 and equation  6, which replaces  the current  tax rate 
change  with the future  tax rate change  and lagged  capital  gains, suggests  that the overall 
fit is about  the same, so that the statistical  (as opposed to theoretical)  superiority  of the 
latter  approach  is questionable.  However, once the sample  period  is extended through 
1986,  the results  diverge  considerably.  Compared  with  the  R2  of 0.718  reported  in equation 
8 for the second specification,  the use of the current  change  in taxes leads (in  a regression 
not reported  in the table)  to an R2  of 0.563. Alan  J. Auerbach  609 
In equation  5, where both tax rate changes enter, the future  tax rate 
change performs  somewhat  better than the change over the past year, 
but it is still insignificant,  even when the tax change  over the past year is 
dropped  in equation  6. For two reasons, it is, in principle,  preferable  to 
enter a fitted  value of this variable  in the regressions  using instruments 
present in the information  set at the current  date. First, there may be 
simultaneous  equations  bias of uncertain  direction  if the current  level of 
capital gains realizations  affects future tax rate changes. Second, and 
probably more important,  future tax rates are not always known in 
advance. Under the rational  expectations hypothesis, actual  future  tax 
rates  are  distributed  around  the rate  currently  expected. Using  the actual 
tax rate in the equation will thus bias the coefficient estimate toward 
zero by the standard  errors-in-variables  argument. 
The coefficient of the future tax rate change in equation  7, which is 
estimated using two-stage least squares, suggests indeed that such 
downward  bias is present  in the ordinary  least squares  estimates.22  The 
future  tax rate's effect in equation  7, though  economically  important,  is 
estimated imprecisely, reflecting  the difficulty  of predicting  future tax 
rates  using  aggregate  time series variables. 
Lagged  capital  gains  enters with the "correct" sign in equations  5-8, 
suggesting  that capital  gains realized  today are reduced  by roughly  one 
dollar  for every ten dollars of capital gains realized a year earlier. As 
with  the expected future  tax rate  change, these coefficients  are econom- 
ically significant  but estimated  with little precision. 
PERMANENT  TAX  EFFECTS 
Adding current or predicted tax rate changes to the specification 
drastically  alters the estimates of the permanent  effect of tax changes. 
In  equation  7, the permanent  effect, equal  to the coefficient  of the current 
tax rate itself, is just -  1.  13, with a t-statistic  of just - 0.24, making  the 
permanent  effect considerably  smaller  and  even less significant  than  the 
temporary  one. When  evaluated  at the sample mean marginal  tax rate, 
the implied  permanent  tax elasticity in equation  7 is - 0.20. The "tem- 
porary"  elasticity, associated  with  the additional  realizations  that  would 
attend  a one-year  tax change  that  is expected to be entirely  reversed  the 
22. Excluded  variables  used  as instruments  are  lagged  values  of all  included  exogenous 
variables,  including  the marginal  tax rate. 610  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
following year, equals the expected tax change coefficient times the 
sample  mean  tax rate, or - 0.45. 
It should  be stressed that the low t-statistics  associated with the tax 
rate  coefficients  do not imply  that taxes are unimportant  in their  impact 
on capital  gains realizations.  Indeed, largely  because of the significant 
increase  in capital  gains taxes for 1987,  equations  in table 2 that include 
the future tax rate do predict a large increase in realizations  for 1986, 
though  not as large  as the actual  increase.  For example,  the level of 1986 
realizations  predicted  using equation  7 and based on actual 1985  reali- 
zations is $265.1 billion, below the actual value of $324.8 billion but 
significantly  above the $166.4  billion  of gains realized  in 1985.23 
Given these underpredictions,  it is not surprising  that including  1985 
and 1986  in the estimation  sample  period  increases  the coefficient  of the 
expected tax change  term in equation  7. The result  is reported  as equa- 
tion 8. In this equation, the permanent  tax effect is just  -0.25,  with 
a t-statistic  of - 0.08. The evidence for a permanent  tax effect is weak 
indeed. 
What  conclusions about  existing time series evidence may one draw 
from  these results?24  First, researchers  have not paid  adequate  attention 
23. Aggregate  marginal  tax rates  for 1986  and 1987  that  are exactly comparable  to the 
CBO measures  for 1954-85  are not available,  and would require  calculations  based on 
microeconomic  data  similar  to those performed  by CBO. However,  the CBO  report  does 
give such  measures  for 1988  based  on 1988  (post-tax-reform)  and 1986  (pre-tax-reform)  tax 
laws. These should  be similar  to the unavailable  1986  and 1987  aggregate  tax rates,  and  are 
used in their  place. 
24. The relatively  similar  data and approaches  of most time series studies mean  that 
these conclusions  apply  quite  generally  to past  time  series  efforts.  One  possible  exception 
is Lindsey, "Capital  Gains: Rates, Realizations, and Revenues," who considered a 
pseudo-panel,  a series  of annual  cross-sections  made  up  of separate  adjusted  gross  income 
classes  reported in the annual IRS Statistics  of Income: Individual Tax Returns. Lindsey 
found large  coefficients  for tax rates, with values for the current  tax rate in the semilog 
level specification  ranging  from - 5.1 to - 7.4. Attempts  by CBO,  How Capital  Gains  Tax 
Rates Affect Revenues,  to estimate  approximately  the same equations  on aggregate  time 
series found the tax rate effects to be considerably  smaller, even smaller than those 
reported  in table 1. The CBO study attributes  this to its lack of Lindsey's cross-section 
variation,  a possibility  given the very large  responses  found  in some earlier  cross-section 
work  with  microeconomic  data  (see below). 
Another  possible explanation  may be Lindsey's use of cell aggregates  (rather  than 
these aggregates  divided by the number  of taxpayers  in the cell) for variables  such as 
capital  gains  and  wealth.  Given  the large  differences  in cell size, this leads to a character- 
ization  of the lowest income  cell as the wealthiest  and  the two highest  income  cells (where Alan J. Auerbach  611 
to the importance  of the timing  of tax changes. In equation  7 in table  2- 
a specification  that includes the predicted  future tax rate change-the 
permanent  effect is about one-third  the size of the temporary  effect of 
taxes on realizations.  The permanent  effect is virtually  zero if 1985  and 
1986  are added  to the sample period (equation  8). Second, the tax rate 
coefficients are not estimated  with enough precision to warrant  strong 
conclusions about the impact of capital gains tax rates on realizations 
and  revenue. 
The extent of this uncertainty  may  be demonstrated  by simulating  the 
effects on revenues  and  realizations  of a hypothetical  tax cut under  three 
plausible  statistical  assumptions.  Consider  a cut in the tax rate on long- 
term capital gains from 25 percent (the approximate  value of CBO's 
weighted average marginal  tax rate in 1988) to  15 percent, the rate 
recently proposed by President-elect  Bush. For illustrative  purposes, 
let us assume that average and marginal  tax rates are equal, so that 
revenue  effects can  be easily computed,  and  that  the tax change  is known 
with certainty  in advance. Each simulation  is based on equation  8. The 
first  assumes  that  both the permanent  tax effect and  the tax change  effect 
are zero.  This leads to  a  "static" revenue loss  calculation, since 
realizations  are assumed  not to change.  The second simulation  assumes 
the entire simulated tax effect to be permanent. If one reinterprets 
equation  8 as a regression  on the current  and  future  tax rates rather  than 
current  tax rate and future tax rate change, this amounts  to assuming 
that  the coefficient  on the future  tax rate  is zero, and  adding  together  the 
permanent  and temporary  effects of the current  tax rate. Since the t- 
statistic  of the future  tax rate  in this reinterpretation  of equation  8 would 
be the same as that of the tax rate change  in equation  8, the assumption 
is surely plausible. The third simulation  assumes that each coefficient 
equals  its point estimate. None of these coefficient  assumptions  comes 
close to being statistically  rejected. 
Table  3 reports  the results  of these three simulations,  beginning  in the 
first  year when revenues or realizations  could change-that is, the year 
a large  fraction  of the capital  gains is concentrated)  as the poorest.  This surely  leads to a 
biased estimate  of the wealth elasticity of realizations,  while the effect on the tax rate 
coefficient  is difficult  to guess. The (unavoidable)  use of a standard  income  measure  that 
includes  realized  capital  gains to group  taxpayers  into cells may also have led to biased 
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Table 3.  Simulating the Effects on Revenues and Realizations of an Anticipated 
Reduction in the Marginal Tax Rate from 25 Percent to 15 Percent 
Percent change 
Realizations  Revenuesa 
Parameter  assumptions  Parameter  assumptions 
No future  Point  No future  Point 
Year after  tax rate  esti-  tax rate  esti- 
change  Staticb  effectc  matesd  Staticb  effectc  matesd 
- 1  0  0  -28  0  0  -28 
0  0  42  6  -40  -15  -37 
1  0  38  2  -40  -17  -39 
2  0  38  3  -40  -17  -39 
Long run  0  38  3  -40  -17  -38 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on equation 8 in table 2. 
a.  Revenue  calculations  assume  equal marginal and average tax rates. 
b.  Assumes  that realizations  are unaffected  by tax rates. 
c.  MTR(+  1) in equation 8 implicit in the DMTR(+  1) variable set equal to zero. 
d.  Point estimates  from equation 8 in table 2. 
before the tax rate changes, denoted year -  1. The static simulation 
shows no change in realizations and a40 percent-(25  -  15)/25-decline 
in tax revenues in each year after the tax reduction. The second 
simulation  yields revenue  effects similar  to those reported  by the CBO.25 
Realizations  increase  each year about  40 percent, and  revenues, though 
falling, decline by less than half the static revenue loss. However, the 
third  simulation,  in which virtually  all the tax effect is temporary,  tells 
quite  a different  story. Once  tax  rates  have changed  (and  are  not  expected 
to  change again), realizations change scarcely at all after a  small 
temporary  increase in reaction to the drop in year -  1, and revenue 
declines by almost the 40 percent  predicted  by the static simulation.  In 
addition,  realizations  and revenue  fall 28 percent  in the year before the 
tax change,  as taxpayers  await  the decline in capital  gains  taxes. The net 
result of this third  simulation  is that revenues decline more, in present 
value, than in the first simulation, which assumes no response by 
investors  to the tax cut. 
The "bottom line" from the time series evidence is, therefore, that 
tax changes may exert a powerful effect on capital gains realizations, 
but the size  of  this effect and its  revenue implications cannot be 
determined from such data alone. 
25. CBO, "Simulating  the Revenue  Effects." Alan J. Auerbach  613 
Further Evidence Based on Microeconomic  Data 
The availability  of tax return  data  at the level of individual  households 
offers a promising  alternative  to aggregate  time series data  for research 
on the effects of capital  gains  taxes on realization  behavior.  The number 
of observations is typically a thousand times greater, and restrictive 
assumptions  about the aggregability  of individual  responses into those 
of a "representative"  household  are unnecessary.  Moreover,  the infor- 
mation on households and assets  of  different types has permitted 
researchers  to identify differences in behavioral  responses among dif- 
ferent  classes of investors  and  with  respect  to the sales of different  kinds 
of assets. 
Of several  studies  using  household  data, some have found  tax elastic- 
ities considerably  larger  than  those from  the time series studies. Martin 
Feldstein,  Joel Slemrod,  and Shlomo  Yitzhaki  produced  one of the first 
studies  using  microeconomic  data,  based  on a 1973  Treasury  sample  that 
included  more  detailed  information  on asset sales and capital  gains  than 
is normally  retained  by the  Treasury  in the drawing  of its annual  stratified 
sample  for  use in tax analysis  .26 Looking  exclusively at sales of corporate 
stock by individuals  with at least $3,000  in dividend  income (and  hence 
at least $100,000  in common stock at the average  dividend  yield), they 
estimated the responsiveness of realized long-term  gains and losses. 
Unlike  the  measures  used  in  the  time  series  studies,  this  measure  includes 
positions  with net long-term  losses.27  As discussed below, the inclusion 
of such positions may have a strong influence  on reported  elasticities. 
Because some of their  observations  have negative  dependent  variables, 
Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki could not use the semilogarithmic 
specification.  Instead, they used a linear model to explain the ratio of 
gains  (or losses) to adjusted  gross income. 
26. Martin  Feldstein,  Joel Slemrod,  and Shlomo  Yitzhaki,  "The Effects of Taxation 
on the  Selling  of Corporate  Stock  and  the Realization  of Capital  Gains,"  Quarterly  Journal 
of Economics,  vol. 94 (June  1980),  pp. 777-91. 
27. As discussed above, taxpayers with net long-term losses are likely to face 
constraints  on the  deductibility  of such  losses for  tax  purposes  and  hence  a current  marginal 
tax rate  of zero. When  analyzing  microeconomic  data, one can (and  Feldstein, Slemrod, 
and  Yitzhaki  and  other  authors  do) allow  the taxpayer's  marginal  tax rate  on capital  gains 
to vary according  to his situation. However, this cannot be done with aggregate  time 
series,  making  such heterogeneity  a problem. 614  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
To avoid simultaneity  bias, they treated  actual marginal  tax rates as 
endogenous,  using  two tax rates  constructed  to be independent  of actual 
realization  behavior  as instruments.  These constructed  tax rates were, 
for each taxpayer,  the first-dollar  tax rate-the  marginal  tax rate faced 
on the first  dollar  of capital  gains  realized-and the predicted  last-dollar 
tax rate-the  marginal  tax rate faced on the last dollar  of capital  gains 
that  would be predicted  on the basis of nontax  characteristics. 
Because of its linear form, the elasticity implied by the estimated 
equation  is variable,  but equals - 3.75 for the regression  based on their 
full sample when evaluated at reported sample means. A permanent 
elasticity this high would imply that a capital  gains tax cut would raise 
tax revenue substantially,  although  the authors  acknowledged  that part 
of their  measured  effect may be temporary. 
Joseph Minarik  challenged  these results on two grounds.28  First, he 
suggested  using an average tax rate for predicted  gains rather  than the 
first-dollar  and  predicted  last-dollar  marginal  tax rates  used  by Feldstein, 
Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, arguing  that this is a better measure  of the tax 
rate  faced  by investors  deciding  whether  or not  to realize  gains.  Although 
this criticism  highlights  the difficulty  of representing  a tax schedule  by a 
single tax rate, there is no strong theoretical  justification  for choosing 
one summary  tax  rate  over  another.  Without  a model  based  on optimizing 
household behavior, it is hard to know exactly how the tax schedule 
should  appear  in the estimated  regression. 
Another  potential  problem  in the measurement  of marginal  tax rates 
is that, with all individuals  in a cross-section sample  facing  the same tax 
schedule, it is difficult to identify many truly exogenous sources of 
variation  in marginal  tax rates among  taxpayers. Much  of the variation 
observed  in individual  tax rates, even controlling  for realized  gains, may 
be due  to behavioral  differences,  and  this  could  lead  to spurious  results.29 
For example, suppose individuals  differ with respect to their taste for 
risk taking.  Some hold safe and typically  high-yield  investments, while 
28. Joseph  Minarik,  "The Effects of Taxation  on the Selling  of Corporate  Stock and 
the Realization  of Capital  Gains:  Comment,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics, vol. 99 
(February  1984),  pp. 93-110. Also see Minarik,  "Capital  Gains," in Henry  J. Aaron  and 
Joseph A. Pechman, eds.,  How} Taxes Affect Economic  Behavior (Brookings,  1981), pp. 
241-77. 
29. This argument  is found in Gravelle, "Will Reducing  Capital  Gains Taxes Raise 
Revenue?" Alan  J. Auerbach  615 
others  hold  riskier  assets with  little  current  taxable  income  but  substantial 
growth potential. The latter group would have less measured  income 
and a lower marginal  tax rate than the former, but would on average 
accrue and presumably  realize more capital  gains. Given that gains for 
individuals  with similar  preferences  would  rise with income  and  wealth, 
this additional  source of variation  would bias downward  the estimated 
effect of true income and overstate the impact  of tax rates: one would 
observe too many  relatively  "poor" people with low marginal  tax rates 
realizing  gains. 
Similar  criticisms arise in other contexts, but it is difficult  to know 
how serious  a problem  this  is. The challenge  is to identify  an  independent 
source of marginal  tax rate  variation  to find  out. One possibility  is state- 
by-state variations in tax rules, which have been used for a similar 
sample to validate previous results in the area of charitable  contribu- 
tions.  30 
Minarik's  second criticism  of Feldstein, Slemrod,  and Yitzhaki  was 
that their  use of unweighted  ordinary  least squares  ignored  the fact that 
the sampling technique, which stratified by adjusted gross income 
including realized capital  gains, oversampled  individuals  who realized 
large  gains. Using population-weighted  least squares  (with each obser- 
vation weighted by the inverse of its sampling  probability),  he found a 
significantly  smaller  tax rate  coefficient,  corresponding  at sample  means 
to - 0.44 in his preferred  specification. 
However, in their response, Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki  point 
out that if responsiveness  to tax rates  varies  by sample  weight  (which  in 
this stratified  high-income  sample is inversely related to income), re- 
weighting  will also shift the estimated effect toward that of the high- 
weight  (low-income)  group.3'  They confirm  this effect, showing  that  the 
omission of relatively  lower-income  (adjusted  gross income first  below 
$50,000, then below $100,000)  households before weighting  brings  the 
tax rate coefficient close to the value they estimated originally.  That 
these omitted  classes represent  a relatively  small  fraction  of capital  gains 
realizations  suggests that the relevant  elasticity, if one is interested in 
30. Daniel  Feenberg,  "Are  Tax  Price  Models  Really  Identified:  The  Case  of Charitable 
Giving,"  National  Tax Journal, vol. 40 (December  1987),  pp. 629-33. 
31. Martin  Feldstein,  Joel Slemrod,  and Shlomo  Yitzhaki,  "The Effects of Taxation 
on the Selling  of Corporate  Stock  and  the Realization  of Capital  Gains:  Reply," Qularterly 
Jouirnal  of Economics,  vol. 99 (February  1984),  pp. 111-20. 616  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
aggregate  predictions  of realizations  and revenue effects, is large after 
all. 
Put another way, a cell's economic size rather  than its population 
should  be used in deriving  its weight.32  The appendix  demonstrates  this 
result more formally. However, the appropriate  choice of weighting 
scheme  does not  fully  dispose  of the problem  of individual  heterogeneity. 
Though  it may ensure that aggregate  revenue predictions  are accurate, 
it will not correct the mistaken  characterization  of individual  behavior 
imposed  by the model. That mistake  can be corrected  only by allowing 
variations  in tax-rate responsiveness among individuals  according to 
their  observable  characteristics,  a feasible improvement  given the large 
number  of cross-section  observations. 
A further  problem  of analysis  based on a single  cross section is that  it 
is difficult  to distinguish  the temporary  and  permanent  effects of taxation 
on realizations.  Only  one tax rate per taxpayer  is observed, so the only 
way to estimate  its relationship  to the taxpayer's  rate  in other  years  (past 
or future)  is by comparing  it with the tax rates  faced in the same sample 
and year by otherwise  similar  taxpayers.  This further  begs the question 
of identification  raised  above, and in any event will uncover variations 
in individual  tax rates  arising  from  idiosyncratic  but  not  common  factors, 
such as changes in tax legislation. A satisfactory  solution requires  the 
use of panel  data. 
Few studies to date are based on panels of microeconomic data. 
Gerald  Auten and Charles Clotfelter examined a seven-year panel of 
taxpayers  from 1967  through  1973.33  A cost of using such panel data is 
that information  on detailed  asset transactions  is not publicly  available, 
so that  Auten and Clotfelter  could not look separately  at common  stock 
transactions.  In addition,  their seven-year  panel did not have the same 
degree of oversampling  as did Feldstein, Slemrod,  and Yitzhaki's 1973 
32. Indeed,  weights  based  on predicted  capital  gains  were used by CBO,  How Capital 
Gains Tax  Rates Affect Revenues, to calculate  aggregate  marginal  tax rates for its time 
series  regressions.  The  CBO's  time  series  study  also considers  the  relative  responsiveness 
of low-income  and  high-income  individuals,  finding  that  the tax coefficients  in the semilog 
specification  for the top 1 percent and bottom 99 percent of tax returns  are virtually 
identical.  It is difficult  to identify  the source  of the discrepancy  between  this  result  and  the 
strong  distributional  effect identified  by Feldstein,  Slemrod,  and  Yitzhaki. 
33. Gerald  Auten  and Charles  Clotfelter,  "Permanent  versus Transitory  Tax Effects 
and  the  Realization  of Capital  Gains,  " Quarterly  Journal  ofEconomics,  vol. 97 (November 
1982),  pp. 613-32. Alan J. Auerbach  617 
data on the high-income individuals who realize such a substantial 
portion  of all capital  gains. Given the apparently  different  behavior of 
high-  and low-income  taxpayers,  this is a potentially  important  consid- 
eration.  Only  about  one-third  of their  sample  realized  gains. 
To evaluate the impact of changes in tax rates on behavior, Auten 
and Clotfelter  denote a three-year  moving average of a taxpayer's tax 
rate as the permanent  tax rate and the difference  between that and the 
current  marginal  tax rate as the temporary  tax rate, using a first-dollar 
tax rate measure. As discussed above, it is difficult to interpret  the 
coefficients of lagged tax rates because they proxy for the effects of 
expected future  tax rates and past realization  behavior. Nevertheless, 
their  inclusion  is a significant  step forward. 
In the semilog specification  explaining  long-term  gains net of short- 
term losses, the same functional  form and dependent  variable  used in 
the time series analysis presented above, Auten and Clotfelter  find a 
statistically  insignificant  realization  elasticity of -0.36  with respect to 
the permanent  tax rate and a statistically  significant  elasticity of - 0.91 
with respect to the temporary  tax rate. Though these elasticities are 
qualitatively  similar  to those reported  for the time series regressions 
above, one must  keep  in  mind  that  the temporary  tax  effect has  a different 
interpretation  here, being  associated with the change  from  a taxpayer's 
moving average tax rate rather than the change from an anticipated 
one.34 
When, following  Feldstein, Slemrod,  and Yitzhaki,  Auten and Clot- 
felter include observations  with net long-term  losses and use a linear 
rather  than  semilogarithmic  specification,  they find  much  higher  elastic- 
ities,  -  1.45 with  respect  to  permanent tax changes  and  -  3.46  with 
respect to temporary  tax changes, both significant.  Added together, 
these actually exceed Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki's estimated 
34. One  must  also recognize  that  if the true  household  model  is semilogarithmic,  then 
the  tax rate  coefficient  derived  from  an aggregate  time  series  regression  based  on the same 
semilogarithmic  specification  need  not  yield  precisely  the  true  behavioral  coefficient  unless 
the cross-section  distribution  of tax rates remains  stable  over time even as the mean tax 
rate  fluctuates.  Likewise,  the use of such  an aggregate  coefficient  to simulate  the behavior 
of individual  households  need  not yield  the same  total  effect as a simulation  based  directly 
on aggregate  data. The use of this microeconomic  simulation  procedure  by CBO, Howt, 
Capital Gains Tax Rates Affect Revenues,  has been criticized by Darby, Gillingham, and 
Greenlees,  "Direct  Revenue  Effects," but  CBO,  "Simulating  the Revenue  Effects," finds 
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overall tax elasticity, suggesting, somewhat to one's  surprise, that 
sample  differences  and  the inclusion  of capital  gains  on assets other  than 
common  stock may not have a significant  effect on the results. 
It is important  to clarify  why these two sets of results (excluding  and 
including observations with net losses) differ so  much. In general, 
including  observations  with  losses is likely to increase  estimated  elastic- 
ities. The crucial  issue is which elasticity is most relevant  for predicting 
aggregate  changes  in tax revenue.  The  large  elasticities  based  on samples 
that  include  losses are likely to overestimate  aggregate  revenue  effects. 
To understand  why estimated  elasticities  are  likely  to rise  when  losses 
are included,  consider  the following  simplified  model. Individuals  are of 
two types, those with net gains  and those with net losses. Realization  of 
gains  is governed  by the expression: 
G =  -at,  +  c, 
and  realization  of losses by the expression: 
L =  bt_  +  d, 
where t+ is the tax rate  on gains, t_ is the tax rate  on losses, c and d are 
constants, and one would  expect the coefficients  a and b to be positive. 
The elasticity of  realizations of  gains by  the entire population, 
evaluated  at the  sample  mean  G, is  e+  =  -wat+IG,  where  w is  the 
fraction  of the population  having  gains. Including  losses, one obtains  an 
elasticity  of e  =  -  [wat+  +  (1 -  w)bt_]I(G  -  L), where G -  L is the 
average net gain. It is clear that e must exceed e+ in absolute value, 
since the average  gain exceeds the average  gain less loss, and (1 -  w), 
b, and  t  are  all nonnegative.  This  result  holds  even if the responsiveness 
of those with losses to taxation, b, equals zero. For those with losses, 
the elasticity of realizations  with respect to taxes is so high as to be 
undefined  when the base level of realizations  is negative.  Including  such 
individuals  in the sample increases, in absolute value, the estimated 
aggregate  elasticity. 
Each  of these elasticity  calculations  is correct  in  describing  the sample 
on which it is based. However, if one wishes to use the elasticity for a 
prediction  of aggregate  revenue effects, then including  individuals  with 
losses, many  of whom  face a zero marginal  tax rate, is inappropriate.  In 
this example,  if t_ = 0, then the elasticity  e + yields an accurate  estimate 
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with losses is irrelevant  because these individuals'  realizations  have no 
impact on revenue. More generally, as shown in the appendix, the 
appropriate  aggregate elasticity for revenue calculations equals the 
average  of individual  elasticities  weighted  by individual  capital  gains  tax 
payments. If individuals  with losses face lower than average capital 
gains tax rates, the elasticity based on the full sample  will overstate the 
responsiveness  of tax revenue. 
Thus, Auten and Clotfelter's results provide a bridge between the 
very low permanent  tax rate elasticity found using time series and the 
very high  tax rate  elasticity  found  by Feldstein, Slemrod,  and Yitzhaki. 
First, Auten and Clotfelter  attribute  about two-thirds  of the overall tax 
effect to timing. Second, they show that looking  at long-term  gains net 
of losses rather  than  just long-term  gains more than triples the size of 
both permanent  and temporary  elasticities. However, these large elas- 
ticities overstate  the ability  of capital  gains tax cuts to raise revenue. 
Somewhat at odds with Auten and Clotfelter's results are those 
reported  by the Treasury.3"  Based on a (not  publicly  available)  stratified 
high-income sample with asset  detail like Feldstein, Slemrod, and 
Yitzhaki  but unlike Auten and Clotfelter,  it covers realizations  during 
1973-75.  For  the semilog  specification  based  on realizations  of long-term 
gains, it reports a permanent  tax elasticity of -  1.29 for all gains and 
- 2.07 for corporate  shares. 
There  are several  possible sources of the discrepancy  between these 
results and those Auten and Clotfelter report, although  their relative 
importance  is difficult  to gauge.  One  is sample  differences,  in  both  sample 
period  and sampling  method. A second is differences in specification: 
the Treasury  study includes the square  root as well as the level of the 
permanent  tax rate  in its specification.  A third  difference  may  come from 
the way the elasticities  are  calculated.  While  Auten  and  Clotfelter  report 
a point-of-means  elasticity, the Treasury study reports an elasticity 
based on the aggregate simulation results, essentially an average of 
individual  elasticities  weighted  by their  realized  capital  gains. As shown 
in the appendix,  what one would actually  like for revenue calculations 
is an elasticity weighted by individual capital gains tax payments, 
although Treasury's simulated revenue gain from the  1978 tax cut 
35.  Treasury, Capital Gains Tax Reductions  of 1978, tables 4.3 and 4.4. 620  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
suggests  that  this appropriate  elasticity is also greater  than 1 in absolute 
value. 
As noted, a problem  inherent  in cross-section  data  is an investigator's 
inability  to distinguish  temporary  and  permanent  tax rate  effects for any 
individual,  as well as to control for persistent  individual  differences  in 
both realized capital gains and tax rates that could be attributable  to 
other factors. The first of these problems  has been dealt with in panel 
studies. The latter problem could also be attacked using panel data 
through  an explicit  allowance  for individual  heterogeneity,  as in a model 
with fixed effects,  although this would make it harder to  identify 
separately  the effects of differences  in permanent  tax rates. The basic 
problem  even with panel data  is that one principal  exogenous source of 
variation  in tax rates is the common  one due to changes  in the tax law. 
Aside from other issues already  covered, a problem  common to all 
the previous literature  is its failure  to incorporate  the dynamic  aspects 
of the capital  gains tax rules. In particular,  the current marginal  tax rate 
on capital  gains has been treated  as the effective rate on such gains. In 
reality, a taxpayer  facing a current  marginal  tax rate of zero because of 
excess losses faces a higher  marginal  tax  rate  overall,  once  future  changes 
are taken  into account. An increase  in gains  realized  by an investor  with 
excess current  losses will reduce that investor's capital  loss carryover, 
increasing the expected future capital gains tax liability. One can 
construct  a "shadow" tax rate  based on this increase, whose value may 
be very close to a taxable investor's tax rate if the loss carryover is 
expected to be used up in the near  future. It is this tax rate, which may 
be estimated  using panel data, that is relevant  for realization  decisions 
for taxpayers  facing  no current  marginal  tax liability.36 
In conclusion, the cross-section evidence is less at variance  with the 
time series evidence than has been generally thought. Larger cross- 
section elasticities can be explained  in part  by differences  in dependent 
36. For a discussion of  the shadow value approach in the context of  tax loss 
carryforwards,  see Alan  J. Auerbach,  "Corporate  Taxation  in the United  States," BPEA, 
2:1983,  pp. 451-505.  This  issue may  be quantitatively  important,  since  many  taxpayers  do 
face constraints.  Minarik,  "The Effects  of Taxation  on the Selling  of Corporate  Stock and 
the Realization  of Capital  Gains:  Comment,"  reports  that  29.0 percent  of taxpayers  in his 
1973  sample  with dividends  in excess of $50,000  had zero first-dollar  tax rates, and 23.4 
percent  had zero last-dollar  tax rates. Poterba, "How Burdensome  Are Capital  Gains 
Taxes?"  reports  that 18.1  percent  of his 1982  sample  (weighted  by dividends)  faced a zero 
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variables  and  in the treatment  of temporary  tax changes.  However, even 
after  making  these corrections,  at least one panel  study  does find  greater 
than unitary  tax realization  elasticities for gains on common stock and 
all long-term  gains.  The implications  for revenue  estimation  are  unclear. 
Beyond the difficulty  of reconciling  the variety  of available  estimates is 
the problem  already raised that observed variations  in permanent  tax 
rates in these samples  capture  individual  differences  rather  than differ- 
ences in tax policy over time. The assumption  that these individual  tax 
rate differences are not simultaneously  influenced by differences in 
capital  gains realization  behavior  has not been adequately  tested. With 
greater  attention  paid to this and the several other problems  raised in 
this section, future  work  with panel  data  could be quite  valuable. 
Tax Arbitrage and Its Implications 
Most policy discussions of capital  gains tax cuts seem to be based on 
the premise that increases in realizations  would result from increased 
asset turnover  and  fewer capital  gains  being  held  until  death.  One should 
certainly  also mention  increased  compliance,  given recent  evidence that 
the fraction of realizations  reported  is inversely related to the capital 
gains  tax rate.37 
Such analysis takes a familiar  approach to studying the effect of 
taxation:  it assumes  that  there  is a taxed  and  an untaxed  activity  and  that 
reductions  in the rate  of tax cause a shift  toward  the taxed  activity. Basic 
textbook analysis of the incidence and efficiency effects of taxation 
follows the same paradigm.  Among its implications  are that a large 
response of the taxed activity to the tax rate shows that the tax is 
distortionary  and  that  the revenue  effects of a change  in the tax rate  may 
be measured  by looking only at the direct revenues from the taxed 
activity. 
Yet because  much  of capital  gains  realization  activity  represents  "tax 
arbitrage,"  with taxpayers  realizing  long-term  capital  gains and paying 
taxes to avoid other, higher taxes, a different analytical  approach  to 
questions  of efficiency  and incidence  is needed. A tax cut that  increases 
37. See James M. Poterba, "Tax Evasion and Capital  Gains Taxation,"  American 
Economic Review, vol. 77 (May 1987), pp. 234-39. 622  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
realizations  through  increased  arbitrage  actually  may reduce  efficiency, 
because  it lowers  tax revenue  and  forces increases  in other  distortionary 
taxes. Likewise, the total  taxes paid  by those who increase  their  arbitrage 
activities actually decline. Thus, a policy that lowers the capital gains 
tax rate but increases the capital  gains taxes paid  by certain  individuals 
may actually  represent  a shift of the direct  overall  tax burden  to others. 
As many  authors  have pointed  out, capital  gains realizations  may be 
especially sensitive to taxation  because they are financial  transactions 
that  need not be closely connected  to changes  in real  behavior.  There  is 
solid evidence that investors follow end-of-year  loss realization  strate- 
gies and  hold  gains  until  they qualify  for long-term  tax treatment.38  Such 
behavior may be thought of as passive tax arbitrage,  possible even if 
investors' portfolios  are themselves not influenced  by the existence of 
capital gains taxes.  Corresponding  to  tax revenues collected from 
realizations of long-term  gains are greater revenues lost on realized 
short-term  losses. 
However,  active  manipulation  of portfolios  through  a series  of hedging 
transactions  that  create  offsetting  gain  and  loss positions,  combined  with 
the ability  to hold gains  and realize  losses, allows an investor, at least in 
theory, to approach pure arbitrage strategies, in which underlying 
portfolio  disruptions  caused by the offsetting  transactions  are minimal, 
and  arbitrarily  large  tax reductions  may be generated.39 
In the presence of this kind  of arbitrage,  reductions  in the realization 
of certain long-term  gains may very well signify a net increase in tax 
revenue and an increase in economic efficiency as well, as the social 
resources expended engaging  in arbitrage  are also reduced. Consider, 
for example, the capital  gains tax changes  of 1986.  On the one hand,  the 
increased  tax on long-term  realizations  reduced  the incentive to realize 
locked-in long-term  capital gains, a clear increase in the distortion  of 
individual  economic behavior. On the other hand, by removing the 
38. Joel Slemrod,  "The Effect of Capital  Gains  Taxation  on Year-End  Stock Market 
Behavior,"  National  Tax Journal, vol. 35 (March  1982),  pp. 69-78;  Thomas  A. Barthold, 
"Investor  Capital  Gains  Realization  Behavior  in Response  to Capital  Gains  Tax Rates" 
(Dartmouth  College, n.d.); Stephen Kaplan, "The Holding Period Distinction of the 
Capital Gains Tax,"  Working  Paper 762 (National Bureau of  Economic Research, 
September  1981). 
39. George M. Constantinides,  "Capital  Market  Equilibrium  with Personal  Tax," 
Economnetrica, vol. 51 (May 1983),  pp. 611-36;  Joseph  E. Stiglitz, "Some Aspects of the 
Taxation  of Capital  Gains,"  Journal of Public Economics,  vol. 21 (July  1983),  pp. 257-94. Alan  J. Auerbach  623 
distinction  between realized  long-term  capital  gains and other income, 
the 1986  act also may have reduced  long-term  realizations  by lowering 
the incentive to engage in socially wasteful transactions  to generate 
long-term  gains and short-term  losses and in other ways convert fully 
taxable  income into capital  gains. 
To weigh these two effects, it is important  to know how significant 
tax arbitrage  is in the realization  of capital  gains. Even though  aggregate 
realizations  year-in  and year-out  are dominated  by long-term  gains and 
short-term  losses, the kind  of matching  one would  expect from  arbitrage 
trading  does not appear. 
In 1982, for example, $95.7 billion of gross long-term  capital gains 
was reported on individual  tax returns.40  Long-term  losses and loss 
carryovers offset $7.3 billion of this amount, and short-term  losses 
another  $2.3 billion, leaving  long-term  gains net of short-term  losses of 
$86.1 billion. At the same time, gross long-term  losses and loss carry- 
overs amounted  to $21.0 billion. As noted, $7.3 billion of this amount 
offset long-term  gains, another  $1.1 billion  offset short-term  gains, and 
$2.6 billion  was used to offset other  income. The remaining  $10.0  billion 
was carried  forward  as long-term  loss carryovers.  Thus, most long-term 
gains were not matched  by losses, and nearly  half the long-term  losses 
provided  no reduction  in current  taxes. A similar  story holds for short- 
term gains and losses. Of $18.9 billion of gross short-term  losses and 
short-term  loss carryovers,  only $6.3 billion  went to offset capital  gains 
and $3.5 billion to offset other income. Individual  taxpayers entered 
1982  with carryovers  of $8.1 billion  of long-term  losses and $8.0 billion 
of short-term  losses, and carried  $10.0 billion and $9.1 billion, respec- 
tively, into 1983.41 
While  pure  arbitrage  based on capital  gains  and losses may not be the 
primary  -activity  generating  capital gains realizations, other potential 
sources  of increased  realizations  also result  from  tax arbitrage.  Already 
discussed  above was the  timing  effect, with  individuals  transferring  gains 
from  high-tax  to low-tax years. 
In addition, lower capital gains taxes may cause investors to shift 
40. The  following  calculation  relies  on data  provided  by Poterba,  "How Burdensome 
Are Capital  Gains  Taxes?" table 2; and Internal  Revenue Service, Statistics  of Income: 
IndiOidual  Tax Returns,  1982 and 1983. 
41. Further  discussion  of the empirical  evidence  relating  to arbitrage  behavior  may  be 
found  in Poterba,  "How Burdensome  Are Capital  Gains  Taxes?" 624  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1988 
from more  fully taxed assets, increasing  portfolio  distortions  and again 
reducing tax revenue. There is  some evidence of this behavior in 
aggregate data, but it has not been evaluated using microeconomic 
data.42  Finally,  capital  gains  taxes often  change  when  other  taxes change. 
Ignoring such changes in time series analysis may, in some cases, 
overstate the impact of the capital gains tax cut on realizations and 
revenue. For example, in 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax Act not 
only cut capital gains taxes but also introduced  the Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System, encouraging  investors to sell depreciable  property 
being  written  off under  less favorable  rules. Such realizations  would  not 
have been caused by the capital gains tax cut alone and would have 
reduced  tax revenue from these assets in subsequent  years. That data 
on capital  gains realizations  by asset type are not available  on an annual 
basis makes  it difficult  to evaluate  the importance  of this effect. 
One  must  also consider  the implications  of tax arbitrage  behavior  with 
respect to the specification and choice of the dependent variable in 
behavioral  models.  There  are  really  several  behavioral  decisions  at work 
determining  each taxpayer's  level of gross long-term  gains, gross long- 
term  losses, gross short-term  gains, and gross short-term  losses. Theo- 
retical  justification  is weak for imposing  the restrictions  implicit  in the 
estimation of a single equation for long-term  gains net of short-term 
losses,  which aggregates the four categories. Equal changes in this 
aggregate  due to changes in different  components may have different 
implications,  and  offsetting  changes  in components  that  have no impact 
on the aggregate may represent important  behavioral changes. For 
example, an anti-arbitrage  policy that reduces gross gains and losses 
equally  and  has  no effect on net  gains  could  increase  economic  efficiency. 
As this consideration  of tax arbitrage  indicates, special caution is 
demanded  in applying  standard  welfare  analysis  to the existing  empirical 
estimates of the effects of capital  gains taxation. Subsequent  empirical 
investigations  must  take  more  seriously  the implications  of tax arbitrage, 
starting  with  the most basic allowance  for future  tax changes  and  the tax 
treatment  of other  assets and  then  attempting  to distinguish  the different 
motives  for realizing  capital  gains. This is not a simple  task. 
42. Eric W. Cook and John F. O'Hare, "Issues Relating  to the Taxation  of Capital 
Gains,"  National Tax  Journal,  vol. 40 (September  1987),  pp. 473-88, find  that  interest  and 
dividend  income  is negatively  and  significantly  related  to the spread  between  the  maximum 
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The Goals of Capital Gains Tax Reductions 
So much attention has been given to the revenue effects of capital 
gains tax cuts that their underlying objectives have received little 
scrutiny.  It is safe to say that the encouragement  of tax arbitrage  is not 
explicitly such an objective, even though  it may be a side effect. More 
reasonable objectives include the reduction of the lock-in effect on 
holding gains, relief from tax of the inflation-induced  component of 
capital  gains, and  encouragement  of risky  enterprises.  A brief  review of 
these objectives shows that cutting capital gains taxes is not the best 
way to achieve them. 
Reducing  or eliminating  capital  gains taxes would surely reduce the 
lock-in  effect, but so would  other  policies. The simplest  one would  be to 
replace  the current  step-up  in basis at death with the taxation  of capital 
gains through  constructive  realization  or with the less potent policy of 
basis carryover.43  Both policies would reduce the lock-in effect by 
increasing  future  taxes instead of decreasing  current  ones. Comparing 
them with capital gains tax reductions  amounts  to asking  whether  it is 
better  to achieve more uniform  taxation  by raising  the low tax rates or 
lowering  the high ones. Since the two types of policy differ primarily 
with  respect  to the general  level of tax imposed  on assets yielding  capital 
gains, the answer  depends  on what  that  level of tax should  be. While  this 
question may be difficult  to answer, a clearer path toward increased 
efficiency  would  be to follow a policy that  maintained  the present  lifetime 
tax burden  on capital  assets by increasing  taxes at death and reducing 
the current  rate on realized gains, reducing  the lock-in effect without 
changing  the overall investment incentive. To the extent that estates 
arise  from  precautionary  saving  rather  than  a bequest  motive, this policy 
would  be even more  attractive,  since such  saving  would  not  be influenced 
by an increased  tax burden  after  death. 
43. Basis carryover  was scheduled  for introduction  by the Tax Reform  Act of 1976, 
but  was repealed  before  taking  effect. Auten  and  Clotfelter's  results  provide  evidence  that 
as taxpayers  age, their  capital  gains realizations  rise and then, after  age 75, fall. This is 
consistent  with the theory  that (because assets have positive expected returns)  accrued 
gains  increase  with age but that as the time of bequest  approaches,  the tax incentive to 
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That  capital  gains  taxes tend to be cut during  periods  of high  inflation 
(such as 1978 and 1981)  is more than coincidence. As has been well 
documented,  realized  capital  gains  may  be subject  to tax rates  that  easily 
exceed 100  percent  of real  gains in the presence of inflation."  Reducing 
the rate of tax on nominal realized gains ameliorates  this effect, but 
indexing  of capital  gains  for  inflation  does so in  a more  direct  and  accurate 
manner.45 
In an efficient capital market, there is  no argument a priori for 
encouraging  risk taking. When capital gains are taxed on realization, 
arguments  appear.  Unlike other asymmetries  in the tax code regarding 
the treatment  of losses, the limitation  on capital  losses is quite rational 
and necessary because of the voluntary  nature  of realizations.  Without 
it, investors  with large  portfolios  could eliminate  their  entire  tax obliga- 
tions with little difficulty.  Caught  in this net of second-best treatment, 
however, are investors  in risky  assets, since assets with a high  degree  of 
undiversifiable  risk  are more  likely than  relatively  safe assets to land  an 
investor  in a situation  in which he has aggregate  losses well in excess of 
accrued  gains yet may not deduct  them.46 
Indexation  alone offers little help when the marginal  tax rate is often 
zero; taxpayers  with losses in excess of the $3,000  limitation  receive no 
current  tax reduction  from  a policy that simply  increases  the size of the 
losses they cannot  deduct. Hence, indexing  would  further  widen  the gap 
in tax treatment  between risky and safe investments. Therefore,  if the 
problem  of losses cannot be attacked  directly, a reduction  in rates may 
seem attractive  as a solution  to help risky  enterprises. 
However, even though  the new high-technology  firms  often seen as 
the prototype  of risky  venture-capital  investments  do rely heavily  on the 
sale of new equity, a recent calculation  by the Treasury  estimated  that 
about 0.1 percent of outstanding  corporate equity is associated with 
44. See Martin  Feldstein and Joel Slemrod, "Inflation  and the Excess Taxation  of 
Capital  Gains on Corporate  Stock," National Tax Journal, vol. 31 (June 1978), pp. 
107-18. 
45. A plan  to combine  the increased  taxation  of long-term  capital  gains  with  indexation 
was put forward  in the U.S. Department  of the Treasury,  Office of the Secretary, Tax 
Reform for Fairness,  Simplicity and Economic Growth (Treasury, 1984), but only the first 
part  of the plan  was ultimately  followed. 
46. The effect of capital  loss limitations  on risky  investment  has long  been  recognized. 
See, for example,  Joseph  E. Stiglitz, "The Effects of Income, Wealth,  and  Capital  Gains 
Taxation  on Risk-Taking,"  Quarterly  Journal of Economics, vol. 83 (May 1969), pp. 
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venture  capital  operations.47  Cutting  all capital  gains  taxes seems far  too 
broad  a measure  to help such firms. 
A direct  and  fundamental  solution  to the  lock-in  effect  and  the problem 
of loss limitations  would be to tax capital gains on accrual  rather  than 
realization.  As in the example above of shifting  to heavier taxation at 
death, one could construct an accrual  tax that would, on average, not 
impose a heavier  burden  on overall  capital  gains while at the same time 
eliminating  the lock-in effect and permitting  a full deduction  of accrued 
capital  losses. A compelling  case could be made  that such a shift would 
lead to significant  efficiency  gains. 
Accrual  taxation  has already  been adopted  for some financial  instru- 
ments through  so-called "mark-to-market"  rules, and could easily be 
applied  in cases of publicly  traded  common  equity, on which  most of the 
capital gains discussion has centered. The problems associated with 
accrual  taxation  apply  primarily  to other  assets, for which  market  values 
may not be known, and  taxpayers  may lack the liquidity  to pay taxes on 
an asset's accrued  gains  and  be unable  to sell only part  of the asset to do 
so. Even in such cases, the problems  may  be overstated  and  alternatives 
similar to accrual taxation exist.48  It is puzzling why this family of 
alternatives  receives so little attention,  even from  economists. 
Conclusions 
Capital  gains taxes have a strong  impact on the way investors time 
the realization of their long-term capital gains. That fact, however, 
implies little about the costs and benefits of reducing  capital gains tax 
47.  Treasury,  Capital Gains  Tax Reductions  of 1978, p.  139. The study goes  on to 
point  out that roughly  half  the equity in such companies  was provided  by pension  funds 
and  other  investors  not affected  by changes  in capital  gains  tax rates. 
48. David J. Shakow, "Taxation  without  Realization:  A Proposal  for Accrual  Taxa- 
tion,"  University  of  Pennsylvania  Law  Review,  vol.  134 (June  1986), pp.  1111-1205, 
estimates  that relatively  few taxpayers  would lack the liquidity  to pay taxes on accrued 
gains,  even without  shifting  their  portfolios.  Liquidity  problems  could  also be addressed 
by  allowing  taxpayers  to accumulate  their  tax  liabilities  until  gains  were  realized,  following 
the cumulative  averaging  scheme first described by William  Vickrey, "Averaging  of 
Income  for Tax Purposes,"  Jolurnal of Political  Economy, vol. 47 (June 1939),  pp. 379- 
97. Even the unobservability  of market  values before realization  can be overcome by 
imposing  a retrospective  tax on realizations  that  has  the same  incentives  during  the holding 
period  as accrual  taxation.  See Alan  J. Auerbach,  "Retrospective  Capital  Gains  Taxation" 
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rates. Before  policymakers  take such a step, they should  know  far more 
than  anyone yet knows about  the permanent impact  of taxes on capital 
gains  realizations  and  about  what changes  in realizations  signify. 
Future  empirical  analysis  with panel data should  aim at a more exact 
decomposition  of tax effects into  temporary  and  permanent  components, 
a better  modeling  of the dynamic  aspects of realization  behavior  (includ- 
ing  the proper  measurement  of the marginal  tax rates  facing  constrained 
taxpayers),  a more  satisfactory  treatment  of investor  heterogeneity,  and 
more careful attention  to the presence of tax arbitrage.  Policymakers 
need to recognize  not only the empirical  uncertainties  about  the effects 
of capital  gains taxes, but also the full range  of available  alternatives. 
APPENDIX 
IN USING  cross-section data to calculate the appropriate  elasticity of 
realizations  with respect to tax rates, one must deal with two separate 
issues relating  to the weighting  of observations.  First, for a given model 
specification,  the true response to tax rates may differ  among  members 
of the sample.  Hence, the single  coefficient  estimated  will be a weighted 
average  of the true  underlying  responses, with  the weights  depending  on 
the weight  given  each observation  in  the estimation  process. How should 
these estimation  weights be chosen? Second, even if each individual's 
underlying  response to taxation  is estimated  consistently, the elasticity 
of realizations  with  respect  to tax rate  changes  will generally  vary  across 
individuals,  unless  each has  the same  measured  response  and  a constant- 
elasticity (that is,  log-log) specification applies. In a single semilog 
specification,  for example, individuals  with different  levels of capital 
gains  realizations  will have different  elasticities  with  respect  to tax rates. 
How should these different  elasticities be weighted to obtain a single 
aggregate  elasticity? 
One  may  be tempted  simply  to apply  population  weights  in each case, 
to arrive at coefficients and elasticities that are representative  of the 
population.  But what does "representative"  mean in this situation?  If, 
as is the case, a large fraction of the population  realizes a very small 
fraction  of aggregate  capital  gains, the behavior  of this group  will have a 
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Why should  they be given substantial  weight in estimating  coefficients 
or  elasticities?  Intuition  suggests  that  weights  should  bear  some relation- 
ship to capital  gains realizations,  or at least potential  realizations,  and 
this outcome can indeed be formally  demonstrated.  The key step is to 
specify the uses for which the coefficients  and elasticities are intended, 
so that  an explicit  objective can be identified. 
Consider  first  the estimation  problem.  Most analysts  wish to estimate 
the responsiveness  of capital  gains realizations  to tax rates so that they 
can then perform  microeconomic  simulations  calculating  the change in 
tax revenue with respect to a change in tax policy. What estimation 
weights will yield a tax rate coefficient  that delivers  unbiased  estimates 
of the aggregate  revenue  response to tax changes?  The answer  depends 
on the type of tax rate change  envisioned  and  the functional  form  of the 
estimated model, but the general intuition  can be developed using an 
equiproportional  tax rate change and the ratio (of gains to income) 
specification  common  to the cross-section  literature. 
The response of total tax revenue, say R, with respect to such a 
uniform  change  is 
(A.1)  dR =tiGi(ei  +  1), 
where Gi, tj, and ei are, respectively, the realizations, tax rate, and 
elasticity of response of individual  i with respect to his tax rate. In the 
ratio  specification,  individual  i's elasticity is 
(A.2)  ei=  bitiYilGi, 
where Yi  is his income and bi his tax rate responsiveness. Substituting 
equation  A.2 into equation A. 1 yields the true response of revenue to 
the tax change: 
(A. 3)  dR =  Ebi  Yi  + E  tiGi. 
If b*  is the aggregate  estimate  of the capital  gains  response,  the estimated 
aggregate  revenue  effect will be 
(A.4)  dR* =  Eb*i  Yi + EtiGi. 
Let wi be the weight that observation i receives in the estimation 
procedure.  We wish to choose the values  of wi  so that  the expected value 
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calculation  of aggregation  bias. But, to gain intuition,  consider  the case 
of simple regression, where the expected value of G,IYi  is biti.  In this 
case the expression  for b* from  the regression  of GilYi  on ti  is 
(A. 5)  b*  =  (JwitiGi1  yy)(EWiti2)- 
Substituting  equation  A.5 into equation  A.4 and taking  its expectation, 
one obtains: 
(A.6)  E(dR*) =  bi)(  *E  t i  E  tiGi? 
A comparison  of equations  A.6 and A.3 shows that  E(dR*) = dR when 
wi =  Yi.  For the semilog specification,  the same exercise yields weights 
wi = Gi.  (Here,  given  the assumption  that  the weights  are  predetermined, 
one must use a predicted  value for Gi, not its observed value, to avoid 
bias.) In cases of more targeted  tax changes, the weights will be higher 
for those whose tax rates are particularly  affected  and lower for others. 
Though  the appropriate  weights depend on the specification  used and 
the tax experiment  being  considered,  there  is little  justification  for using 
sample  population  weights. These will weight  much  too heavily individ- 
uals with low income and  capital  gains. 
Now, consider  the second  problem  raised  above. Suppose  one already 
has the true parameters  describing each individual's behavior. The 
investigator could proceed directly to microeconomic simulations  to 
obtain the correct revenue effects of tax changes. Suppose, however, 
that he also wished to produce  a single, aggregate  elasticity that corre- 
sponded  to this  underlying  behavior.  This  is not  a superfluous  calculation; 
given the complexities of microeconomic simulation exercises, it is 
useful  to have some idea  of how aggregate  behavior  should  look. If, once 
again, the guiding objective is the accurate estimation of aggregate 
revenue effects, then one should weight each observation  according  to 
the amount of revenue it represents. That is,  if one represents the 
aggregate  revenue  relationship  (equation  A. 1)  in terms  of a single  overall 
elasticity e, one obtains: 
(A.7)  dR =  >tiGi(e  +  1). 
For dR as defined in equation A.7 to be correct, the elasticity e must 
satisfy: 
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In contrast, a simulated  elasticity of aggregate  gains with respect to a 
uniform  tax change, as reported  in the 1985  Treasury  panel study, will 
equal 
(A.9)  (I  Giej)I(E Gj). 
The customary procedure of using sample means to calculate an 
aggregate  elasticity can yield very misleading results. For example, 
consider  again  the linear  specification,  in which G/Yis regressed  on the 
tax rate  t. Suppose  the true  model  is one in which  the coefficient  b applies 
to every individual. Then ei =  -  btiYilGi,  and the appropriate aggregate 
elasticity  is, from  equation  A.8, 
(A.  1O)  e  =  b(  t2 Yi)(EtiGi)  =  -b[E(tjYj)tj]l[E(tjYj)Gj1Yj] 
However, the point-of-means  elasticity  equals: 
(A.  1  1)  e =  -b(Etj)1(EGj1Yj). 
Thus, while the correct  procedure  involves weighting  each tax rate and 
ratio of gains to income by the product  of the taxpayer's tax rate and 
income,  the  point-of-means  elasticity  weights  these values  equally  across 
taxpayers.  The result  is that  gains  and  tax rates  will be overweighted  for 
individuals  with low tax rates or income. The general direction  of this 
bias  is ambiguous.  If high-income,  high-tax-rate,  individuals  have higher 
elasticities, the size of the elasticity would tend to be understated. 
However, including  individuals  with capital  losses and low or zero tax 
rates  in the sample  biases the elasticity  upward  in absolute  value; while 
lower  than  average  nonnegative  tax rates  receive too much  weight  in the 
numerator  of expression A.  11, negative values are averaged into the 
denominator-the case discussed in the text. Comments 
and Discussion 
James Poterba: The revenue  effect of changes  in capital  gains taxation 
is currently  one of the most  controversial  issues in  applied  public  finance. 
During the past 15 years a barrage  of studies by economists in both 
government  and academe has suggested that reducing  tax rates may 
increase capital gains realizations enough to  raise the net revenue 
collected by the capital gains tax. An opposing battery of research 
suggests otherwise, arguing  that while realizations  may rise when tax 
rates fall, the resulting  revenue effect is on balance negative. Several 
new studies have appeared  in the past two years, based on aggregate 
time series modeling of  capital gain realizations, but still yielding 
conflicting  results. The debate between these camps has often been 
fierce, in some cases degenerating  to mudslinging  attacks on analytical 
and technical competence that would not have seemed out of place in 
the recent  presidential  campaign. 
Despite the obvious difficulties of  surveying such a contentious 
literature,  Alan Auerbach  has risen above the fray and written  a first- 
rate review. I am largely sympathetic  to this paper's conclusions, and 
my remarks will therefore underscore what I  view as the paper's 
contributions  to the  empirical  and  theoretical  debates  surrounding  capital 
gains  taxation.  I conclude  by noting  the remaining  gaps  in our  knowledge 
and  where research  might  reduce  our ignorance. 
Auerbach's  first  contribution  is to the empirical  debate  on time series 
models of capital  gains realizations.  While most previous studies have 
examined  the link between the level of realized  gains and the contem- 
poraneous level of capital gains tax rates, the paper shows that the 
estimated  steady-state  effect becomes much smaller  when expected tax 
changes are included in the specification.  Controlling  for tax changes 
makes it impossible  to reject the hypothesis  that in the long run  the tax 
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level has  no effect on realizations,  and  if forced  to choose, the data  prefer 
equations  based only on the change in tax rates to specification  based 
only on the level of tax rates. These findings  suggest at the very least 
that existing empirical studies are not robust to minor specifications 
changes, and they signal the inherently  limited  information  in the time 
series data. 
It is hardly  surprising  that  preannounced  changes  in the capital  gains 
tax affect investor behavior. Brief reflection  on the events surrounding 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 illustrates this point. Even a 
casual reader  of the "Personal  Investing" column in most newspapers 
was exposed to simple rules about when to realize gains, and learned 
that accelerating  the sale of assets that he or she planned  to sell in the 
near future would lead to tax savings. My impression of individual 
taxpayer behavior is that when there is a simple behavioral  rule that 
taxpayers  understand  and can use to reduce  their  taxes, they exploit it. 
Last year  the Austrian  government  changed  its tax treatment  of families, 
reducing  the tax benefits  for couples married  after January  1, 1988,  by 
several  hundred  dollars.  During  the last  few months  of 1987,  the Austrian 
marriage  rate reached  record  levels as individuals  rushed  to qualify  for 
the tax allowance.  If taxpayers  will distort  such decisions as marriage  to 
save on their  taxes, I have no doubt  they will adjust  paper  transactions, 
such as the decision to realize capital  gains, in response to obvious tax 
incentives. The present paper's estimates for the full sample period, 
including  1986, suggest that an anticipated  1 percentage  point increase 
in the capital  gains tax rate from the 1986  level of 0.20 would increase 
current  realizations  roughly  15  percent. 
Even if the results regarding  the long-run  effect of the capital  gains 
tax rate on realized  gains had been more robust, however, there would 
be many  reasons  to be suspicious  of the results. Auerbach  mentions  and 
corrects some problems, such as the nonstationarity  of the relevant 
variables, but does not discuss others: failure to model the nontax 
transaction  costs of trading,  omission  of life-cycle or other  variables  that 
might  proxy  for the demand  to realize  gains, and  relatively  weak  proxies 
(such as movements  in the stock market)  for the accumulated  stock of 
unrealized  gains. These factors are likely to change slowly from  year to 
year, thus leading  to more important  biases in estimates of low rather 
than  high  frequency  links between capital  gains taxes and realizations. 
The paper's  finding  that time series results  are not robust  saves readers 
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The new empirical  work is not the paper's only contribution.  It also 
calls attention  to the critical  interactions  between the capital  gains tax 
and other  parts  of the tax structure.  Auerbach  pushes beyond the naive 
Lafferesque  analysis  that  if lowering  the tax rate  on an activity  increases 
the revenue  collected by that tax, it is therefore  a revenue  raiser. Since 
the capital  gains  tax is a tax on one type of income, rather  than  on income 
per se, and since income is at least partially  subject  to transfer  from  one 
category to another, the capital gains tax rate may affect the revenue 
yield from other parts of the income tax system. For example, a high- 
earning  executive may receive substantial  parts of his or her compen- 
sation  in the form  of stock options  that  yield capital  gains, or individuals 
may borrow  heavily to purchase  homes, deduct  interest  payments  from 
ordinary  income, and subsequently pay capital gains taxes on home 
appreciation.  In  both  cases the capital  gains  tax serves as the "backstop" 
for the rest of the tax system. When the tax rate is low, taxpayers will 
expend resources  to transform  other  types of income into capital  gains, 
while  at high  capital  gains  tax rates, such  transactions  are  not warranted. 
Although  the possibility that lowering the capital gains tax rate could 
raise realized capital gains but nevertheless reduce the total revenue 
take  from  the personal  income  tax is sometimes  recognized  in the writing 
of tax analysts, it has had  virtually  no effect on the broader  public  policy 
debate. This point needs to be emphasized, and the current paper's 
discussion is therefore  welcome. One might  note the implication  of this 
view for empirical models of capital gain realizations. Rather than 
focusing on just the capital gains tax rate, one should study how the 
differential  between  the capital  gains  rate  and  other  rates  affects the mix 
of reported  income. 
This paper's central thrust is that aggregate  time series models of 
realized  capital  gains shed relatively  little light on the question of how 
the capital gains tax rate should be set. True to this theme, Auerbach 
avoids the inevitable  tendency of review writers  to conclude with a call 
for future research. Rather,  he calls for a renewed investigation  of the 
policy aims that  might  be served by cutting  the capital  gains  tax. I would 
second this call, and note an obvious question that needs attention. 
Although many call for reductions in capital gains tax burdens on 
incentive  grounds,  tax economists regard  the effective capital  gains tax 
rate, even at current statutory  rates, as lower than most other taxes. 
Since gains are taxed at realization  rather  than on accrual, the govern- 
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due. For an asset that  appreciates  at 10  percent  a year, the effective tax 
rate is less than  half  the statutory  rate if the investor's holding  period  is 
10  years. Changes  in the statutory  rate  therefore  translate  less than  one- 
for-one into changes in effective tax rates. We must learn more about 
the holding  periods  of different  investors  and  different  assets in order  to 
model  their  effective tax rates. 
I also believe that  basic  research  on why investors  realize  gains  should 
be given high  priority.  Models based on life-cycle considerations  or on 
differences  of opinion  between investors might  yield predictions  about 
the level of realized gains. Empirical  verification  of such models will 
prove difficult,  however, because of fundamental  data limitations.  Tax 
return  data,  which  provide  detailed  information  on income, realizations, 
and tax rates, do not contain data on household wealth or unrealized 
gains. Most household  surveys  that  contain  information  on net worth  do 
not include  tax return  data that permit  accurate  calculation  of marginal 
tax rates, and most such random  surveys have very few respondents  in 
the top 0.5 percent  of the income distribution,  where most capital  gains 
are realized. 
The IRS Capital  Gains Tax Panel, spanning  several years beginning 
in 1981  when tax rates changed  systematically,  may provide some new 
insights  on what determines  realized  capital  gains. But cross-sectional 
studies  encounter  problems  that  time series studies  escape. In any year, 
all taxpayers  face the same tax schedule. Conditional  on a taxpayer's 
income, variations  in marginal  tax rates  will largely  result  from  endoge- 
nous factors-whether the taxpayer  is married  or single, whether  he or 
she is a homeowner,  and  the level of taxes in his or her  home state. This 
endogeneity raises a host of problems in the interpretation  of tax 
elasticities estimated  from cross-section data such as the IRS tax files. 
The systematic tax changes of the  1980s may provide the type of 
exogenous variation  that may ultimately  help us to model capital  gain 
realizations,  but given the long lags in processing  tax return  data, such 
progress  may be several years away. In the meantime  we should  admit 
the primitive  state of our knowledge  regarding  the long-run  influence  of 
capital  gains  tax changes  on income tax receipts. 
General  Discussion 
Ben Bernanke  wondered on what conceptual basis analysts could 
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on capital gains. He observed that any induced shift from income to 
capital  gains actually lowers total revenue when income tax revenues 
are taken into account. Any shift forward  in the timing  of capital  gains 
realizations  simply shifts tax revenues from the future to the present. 
And any change in bequest motives could be eliminated  by a proper 
handling  of capital  gains  taxes at death.  Auerbach  agreed  with  the thrust 
of Bernanke's  comments, but mentioned  two avenues through  which 
revenues  conceivably  could  increase.  First, lower  capital  gains  tax rates 
might  reduce  tax evasion, an  effect  James  Poterba  found  to be significant. 
Second, the present  value of tax payments  could increase  if individuals 
realize  gains more  promptly  in response  to lower rates. 
Jane Gravelle  was skeptical  about the use of cross-sectional  econo- 
metric  evidence to determine  the revenue  consequences  of changing  the 
capital  gains tax rate. The primary  problem  is that, with the exception 
of tax rate differences across states,  variation in the tax rates of 
individuals  is endogenous,  reflecting  the level of income  including  capital 
gains. She also suggested that Auerbach's equation should take into 
account the fact that realizations  come from the "stock" of unrealized 
gains  rather  than  just the flow of accrued  gains  in any year. She reported 
that a CBO study using such an equation  found the coefficient on the 
marginal  tax rate  to be small, implying  a revenue-maximizing  tax rate  of 
50 percent. 
Several  participants  broadened  the  discussion  of capital  gains  taxation 
beyond its effect on revenues. George von Furstenberg  argued that 
Auerbach's  evidence that the rate on capital  gains is already  below the 
revenue-maximizing  value contributes  to the political  debate  but should 
be of little  concern  to economists. He suggested  the important  economic 
question  is how to minimize  the excess burden  associated with a given 
level of tax revenues.  Therefore  an analysis  of capital  gains  taxes should 
focus on the marginal  excess burden  of the capital  gains tax compared 
with that of other taxes. Von Furstenberg  went on to suggest that the 
internationalization  of capital markets  makes it likely that the optimal 
capital  gains tax will depend  on the taxation  of gains in other countries, 
where  rates are lower-sometimes  zero. 
One of the excess  burdens of capital gains taxation identified by 
Auerbach  is the resources expended by individuals  as they attempt  to 
delay realizations  of capital gains to reduce the present value of tax 
payments. Alan Blinder  questioned  Auerbach  on proposals  mentioned 
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incentives of a tax based on accrual. He noted that such a tax would 
eliminate both the incentive to shift realizations and the associated 
excess  burden. Auerbach recalled that nearly 50 years ago William 
Vickrey proposed a tax system whereby any two individuals  with the 
same  income stream  but different  patterns  of realizations  would  pay the 
same  present  value of taxes. Vickrey's system eliminates  any incentive 
to alter the time path of realizing  capital gains and has other desirable 
features  as well. It eliminates  the penalty  that a progressive  income tax 
imposes on high-variance  income streams, thus removing a major 
rationale  for treating  capital  gains, with their high variance,  differently 
from  income. Thus  the Vickrey  system treats  earned  income  and  capital 
gains accruals identically, but introduces  no bias against investments 
with lumpy  payoff streams. 
To be applied to realized capital gains, Vickrey's scheme would 
require  knowledge of how those gains occurred over time. For many 
assets, particularly  those not actively traded  in securities  markets,  this 
requirement  could represent  a problem. Auerbach  suggested an alter- 
native scheme that would also provide the incentives of an accrual  tax 
and the convenience of a tax on realizations  without  requiring  informa- 
tion about  the pattern  of accrued  gains, only an asset's final  sales price. 
In place of the actual  pattern  of accrued  gains, the scheme  would  impute 
a pattern  based on risk-free  rates of return  available  over the same time 
period.  In the working  paper  cited in footnote 48, Auerbach  had  proven 
that  this scheme had  the same  incentive  properties  as Vickrey's system. 
He concluded  that proposals  such as Vickrey's and his own addressed 
most of the criticisms  of taxation  of capital  gains  accruals,  including  the 
liquidity  constraints  of investors  and  lack  of information  on asset values. 
Jeremy Bulow suggested an annual  property  tax or wealth tax as a 
simpler  way to the same  end. Rather  than  taxing  capital  gains  (or  losses) 
as they are generated, wealth could be taxed at a rate that raises a 
comparable  amount  of revenue. Such a tax would reduce the variance 
in  taxes paid  each year. Furthermore,  the problem  of measurement  error 
would  be reduced  because usually  wealth  can be measured  with a much 
lower  percentage  error  than  changes  in wealth. 
Robert  Hall observed that  with a fully integrated  tax system, there is 
no need to tax capital  gains directly  because any capital  gains occur on 
the capitalization  of an after-tax  income stream.  He argued  that  a tax on 
business  income such as the current  corporate  income tax is preferable 
to a tax on gains  or assets that  are simply  claims  on that  income. 